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Real Property
by Linda S. Finley"
I.

INTRODUCTION

The survey period, from June 1, 2008 to May 31, 2009,' has been a
volatile period for attorneys who regularly practice in areas involving
real estate. Each day the media is replete with stories involving the
country's historic economic crisis, and the effects can be seen in Georgia

neighborhoods and in resulting legislation. Given our point in history,
the cases and legislation discussed in this Survey were chosen for their
significance to real property law and to update attorneys who regularly
or occasionally practice or render opinions regarding real estate law.
II.

LEGISLATION

The Georgia General Assembly used its 2009 session to consider and
enact legislation designed to lessen the impact of the economic decline
upon Georgia citizens.

Notable legislation enacted during the 2009

session includes Senate Bill 55,2 which, among other things, amended
* Shareholder in the firm of Baker, Donelson, Bearman, Caldwell & Berkowitz, P.C.,
Atlanta, Georgia. Mercer University (BA, 1978); Mercer University, Walter F. George
School of Law (J.D., 1981). Member, State and Federal Bars of Georgia and Florida, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, and the United States Supreme
Court.
The Author wishes to give special thanks to Kitty S. Davis who, year after year, has
methodically reviewed this Article; Robert A. "Andy" Weathers, Esq. who is constantly on
the lookout for cases to include in the Article; and Carol V. Clark, Esq., for her assistance,
not only to the Author, but to the entire Real Property Law Section of the State Bar of
Georgia through her unparalleled analysis of real property law. Particularly, the Author
directs the reader to Carol V. Clark, 2009 Judicial Update, in 1 REAL PROPERTY LAW
INSTITUTE PROGRAM MATERIALS (Institute of Continuing Legal Education in Georgia 2009).
Other Authors of individual sections are credited in footnotes 106, 191, 205, and 287.
1. For analysis of Georgia real property law during the prior survey period, see Linda
S. Finley, Real Property,Annual Survey of Georgia Law, 60 MERCER L. REV. 345 (2008).
2. Ga. S. Bill 55, Reg. Sess., 2009 Ga. Laws 27 (amending scattered sections of O.C.GA
ch. 48-5 (1999 & Supp. 2009)).
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and expanded the factors to be used to determine the value of real
property for ad valorem taxation assessment. 3 Specifically, the Bill
amended section 48-5-2 of the Official Code of Georgia Annotated
(O.C.GA.) 4 to specify six factors to be used in determining the tax value
of real property.' The criteria the county tax assessor must now use to6
determine tax values are: (1) the "[e]xisting zoning of [the] property;"
(2) the "[e]xisting use of [the] property, including any restrictions or
limitations on the use of [the] property" on account of state or federal
laws, rules, or regulations that may limit the use of the property;7 (3)
existing covenants or deed restrictions that dedicate the property to a
particular use;' (4) foreclosures of comparable property;' (5) decrease
in value because the property is subject to a conservation easement; 10
and (6) "[alny other existing factors deemed pertinent in arriving at fair
market value."'
Again looking at Georgia ad valorem taxation and reacting to what it
defined as "a crisis in the reduction of value of tangible property of
unprecedented magnitude,"12 the General Assembly passed House Bill
233" to freeze assessed property values for all taxable real property-including residential, commercial, and industrial-at the 2008
assessment values. 14 The Bill, effective May 5, 2009, amended Title 48
of the Georgia Code and created Chapter 5B, the "Moratorium Period for
16
5
Valuation Increases in Property." Specifically, O.C.G.A. § 48-5B- '
freezes an assessed property value at the 2008 value for the tax years
2009, 2010, and 2011."7 The freeze applies retroactively and covers

3. Id. § 1, 2009 Ga. Laws at 27-28.
4. O.C.G.A. § 48-5-2 (1999 & Supp. 2009).
5. Ga. S. Bill 55, § 1, 2009 Ga. Laws at 27-28 (amending O.C.G.A. § 48-5-2(3)(B) (1999
& Supp. 2009)).
6. O.C.G.A. § 48-5-2(3X)(BXi) (1999 & Supp. 2009).
7. O.C.G.A. § 48-5-2(3)(B)(ii) (1999 & Supp. 2009).
8. O.C.G.A. § 48-5-2(3XBXiii) (1999 & Supp. 2009).
9. O.C.G.A. § 48-5-2(3XB)(iv) (Supp. 2009).
10. O.C.G.A. § 48-5-2(3XB)(v) (Supp. 2009).
11. O.C.G.A. § 48-5-2(3XB)(vi) (Supp. 2009).
12. Ga. H.R. Bill 233, § 1, Reg. Sess., 2009 Ga. Laws 780, 780 (codified at O.C.G.A.
§ 48-5B-l(a) (Supp. 2009)).
13. Ga. H.R. Bill 233, Reg. Sess., 2009 Ga. Laws 780 (codified at O.C.G.A § 48-5B-1
(Supp. 2009)).

14. Id.; see also Bradley A. Hutchins, Deep Freeze: The Effects of House Bill 233, REAL
PROP. L. SEC. NEWSL. (State Bar of Georgia), Summer 2009, at 1-2, available at

http'//www.garealpropertylaw.com/documents/2009-SPRING-SUMMER.pdf.
15. O.C.G.A. ch. 48-5B (Supp. 2009).
16. Id. § 48-5B-1.
17. Id. § 48-5B-1(b).
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even those properties assessed at higher values for the 2009 tax year.'8
Property values can be lowered during the three-year period but cannot
be raised."9 However, the statute sets forth certain exceptions to the
moratorium. First, the statute recognizes that the assessed value should
be based on the true nature of the property; therefore, if there is a
significant change or if the prior assessment was based on "manifest,
factual error or omission," the property can be reassessed. ° Similarly,
if improvements are made to the property during the freeze, then the
assessed value can be adjusted.21 Finally, the statute sets the start
date of the moratorium for those Georgia counties that have recently
undertaken to reassess all of their properties and those counties that
have enacted measures to limit ad valorem tax amounts pursuant to
local constitutional amendment.22 Any county that performed a countywide reassessment of property in 2008 is exempt from the moratorium
until January 2010, at which point the property values are frozen at the
then-current levels. 3 The freeze will also be stayed until January 1,
2010, for any county that contracted for a comprehensive revaluation
prior to February 28, 2009.4
Other legislation of note includes Senate Bill 141,5 which amended
Prior to the
O.C.G.A. § 44-14-16026 and O.C.G.A. § 44-14-162.3.27
revisions, O.C.G.A. § 44-14-160 merely provided directions to the clerk
of the superior court to "write in the margin of the page where the deed
to secure debt or mortgage foreclosed upon is recorded the word
'foreclosed' and the deed book and page number on which is recorded the
Although the
deed under power conveying the real property."2"
scrivener's duties of the clerk to make a notation upon the deed to secure
debt remain, the amendment imposes a duty upon the holder of the
security instrument to record the security instrument "[w]ithin [ninety]

18.

Id.

19. Id. § 48-5B-l(d)-(e).
20. Id. § 48-5B-1(c).

21. Id. § 48-5B-l(f).
22. Id. § 48-5B-1(c), (i).
23. Id. § 48-5B-1(c).

24. Id.
25. Ga. S. Bill 141, Reg. Sess., 2009 Ga. Laws 614.
26.
27.

O.C.G.A. § 44-14-160 (2002 & Supp. 2009).
O.C.G.A. § 44-14-162.3 (2002 & Supp. 2009).

28. O.C.G.A. § 44-14-160 (2002), amended by Ga. S. Bill 141, § 1, 2009 Ga. Laws at 615.
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days of a foreclosure sale."29 Prior to the amendment, there was no
such duty placed upon the lien holder.3"
The amendment also provided some housekeeping of the provisions of
O.C.G.A. § 44-14-162.3 by eliminating subsection (b) of the previous
only to
codification and clarifying that O.C.G.A. § 44-14-162.231 applies
32
the foreclosure of residential and not commercial properties.
At long last recognizing electronic and computer mediums, the General
Assembly passed the Uniform Real Property Electronic Recording Act,'
which sets forth in detail the methods to record deeds and other
Specifically, the clerks of all
instruments by electronic means.'
superior courts are to record "electronic documents" that comply with the
statute in the county real estate records.' The statute defines electronic documents as those "received by the clerk of superior court in an
electronic form"3 and electronic signaturesas "electronic sound, symbol,
or process attached to or logically associated with a document and
executed or adopted by a person with the intent to sign the document."37 Now, a document that is prepared and transmitted in
compliance with the statute satisfies the recording requirement that "a
document be an original, on paper.... or in writing." 8
III. TITLE TO REAL PROPERTY
Title examinations often reveal the existence of a recorded notice of lis
pendens-an instrument designed to give notice to potential interest
holders that real property is involved in a legal action.39 In Boca
Petroco, Inc. v. Petroleum Realty 11,40 the Georgia Supreme Court
addressed the issue of "whether a lis pendens may be filed in Georgia to
give notice of litigation pending outside of Georgia that involves the
Georgia property."41

29. Ga. S. Bill 141, § 1, 2009 Ga. Laws at 615.
30. See O.C.G.A. § 44-14-160 (2002), amended by Ga. S. Bill 141, § 1, 2009 Ga. Laws
at 615.
31.

O.C.G.A. § 44-14-162.2 (2002 & Supp. 2009).

32. Ga. S. Bill 141, § 2, 2009 Ga. Laws at 615.
33. Ga. H.R. Bill 127, Reg. Sess., 2009 Ga. Laws 695 (codified at O.C.GA. §§ 44-2-35
to -39.2 (Supp. 2009)).
34. See O.C.G.A. §§ 44-2-35 to -39.2.
35. Id. § 44-2-38.

36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

Id. § 44-2-36(4).
Id. § 44-2-36(5).
Id. § 44-2-37(a).
See O.C.G.A § 44-14-610 (2002).
285 Ga. 487, 678 S.E.2d 330 (2009).
Id. at 487, 678 S.E.2d at 331.
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The underlying litigation arose in Florida when Boca Petroco, Inc.,
Trico V Petroleum, Inc., and Trico VII, Inc. (collectively, Boca) filed suit
against Petroleum Realty II, LLC and Petroleum Realty V, LLC
(collectively, PR) over lease contracts for properties located in Georgia.
At the time it fied its Florida suit, Boca also fied notices of lis pendens
in the various Georgia counties where the properties subject to the
litigated leases were located. PR sought cancellation of the lis pendens
in each of the Georgia counties where they were filed and achieved
varying degrees of success. Boca appealed the decision of the Gwinnett
County Superior Court cancelling the lis pendens in that county.4 2 The

Georgia Court of Appeals held that the notices of lis pendens filed in
Georgia "were invalid because the Florida court lacked subject matter
jurisdiction over the properties located in Georgia.'
In affirming the court of appeals, the Georgia Supreme Court
performed an exhaustive review of the meaning of lis pendens and its
proper use." Stating that '"[tihe phrase "lis pendens" means, literally,
pending suit,'" the supreme court noted that its purpose is to give notice
to prospective purchasers that the real property is involved in a pending
lawsuit and that the relief sought by the parties to such a suit involves
the particular property.4 5 The court then looked to the common law
origins of lis pendens and noted that to have a valid and effective lis
pendens, a showing of certain elements regarding the property and the
court adjudicating the issues of the underlying lawsuit were required.46
The court also analyzed O.C.G.A. § 44-14-610, 47 the Georgia statute
enacted to address a lis pendens filing.4 This statute provides that a
lis pendens must be filed with the clerk of court in the county where the
property is located and also recorded by the clerk of the superior court
in a book to provide notice of: (1) the legal action, (2) the names of the
parties, (3) when the action was filed, (4) the court in which the action
is pending, (5) the legal description of the property, and (6) a statement
of the relief sought.4 9 In addition to the requirements of the statute,
the court reaffirmed that Georgia law requires a showing of the common

42. Id. at 487-88, 678 S.E.2d at 331-32.
43. Id. at 488,678 S.E.2d at 332 (citing Boca Petroco, Inc. v. Petroleum Realty II, LLC,
292 Ga. App. 833, 837, 666 S.E.2d 12, 15 (2008)).
44. See id. at 488-92, 678 S.E.2d at 332-34.
45. Id. at 488, 678 S.E.2d at 332 (alteration in original) (quoting Boca Petroco, 292 Ga.
App. at 835, 666 S.E.2d at 13).
46. Id. (citing Walker v. Houston, 176 Ga. 878, 879-80, 169 S.E. 107, 108 (1933)).
47. O.C.G.A. § 44-14-610 (2002).
48. Boca Petroco, 285 Ga. at 488, 678 S.E.2d at 332.
49. O.C.G.A. § 44-14-610.
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law elements of lis pendens.5 ° The court noted its affirmation of those
requirements in Scroggins v. Edmondson, 1 in which it identified three
essential elements for a valid lis pendens: first, "'the property must be
of a character to be subject to the rule;'" second, the court must have
both proper personal and subject matter jurisdiction; and third, the
property at issue must be sufficiently described in the pleadings.52
Additionally, "the real property must be involved in the suit... i.e., it
must be property which is actually and directly brought into litigation
as to which some relief is sought
by the pleadings in a pending suit and
53
respecting that particular property."
The supreme court rejected Boca's argument that the jurisdictional
requirement of Scroggins was controlled by where the property in
question lay (Georgia), holding that it was the court having jurisdiction
of the underlying litigation (Florida) that determined the jurisdictional
element.6
The court noted that "[tihe states are split on the question of
extraterritorial application of lis pendens" but distinguished the states
that have "justified this expansion of the reach of common law lis
pendens on policy considerations and/or in light of statutory provisions."55 Unlike those states, Georgia has no statute or other authority
to indicate a legislative intent to expand the scope of lis pendens to
include litigation from other states.56 Then-Presiding Justice Hunstein
dissented from the majority,57 as did Justice Carley.5
In Steinichen v. Stancil,59 the supreme court considered whether a
party claiming title to land by adverse possession could use a prior
tenant's possession to comply with the time of possession requirement.' Karen Steinichen filed suit to quiet title against all the world
to four contiguous parcels. Larry Stancil, the owner of adjacent
property, counterclaimed and sought title to one of the four parcels

50. Boca Petroco,285 Ga. at 489, 678 S.E.2d at 332.
51. 250 Ga. 430, 297 S.E.2d 469 (1982).
52. Boca Petroco,285 Ga. at 489,678 S.E.2d at 332 (quoting Scroggins, 250 Ga. at 432,
297 S.E.2d at 472).
53. Id. (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Scroggins,
250 Ga. at 432, 297 S.E.2d at 472).
54. Id. at 489-90, 678 S.E.2d at 333.
55. Id. at 491, 678 S.E.2d at 333.
56. Id., 678 S.E.2d at 334.
57. See id. at 492, 678 S.E.2d at 334 (Hunstein, P.J., dissenting). Justice Hunstein was
elevated to Chief Justice on July 1, 2009.
58. See id. at 495, 678 S.E.2d at 336 (Carley, J., dissenting).
59. 284 Ga. 580, 669 S.E.2d 109 (2008).
60. Id. at 581, 669 S.E.2d at 110.
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under the theory of adverse possession. 1 Stancil claimed adverse
possession under both color of title (requiring a showing of possession for
seven years)6 2 and prescriptive title (requiring a showing of possession
for twenty years)." The evidence before a special master 4 was that
Stancil acquired the disputed property by deed in 1999 as part of a lot
he purchased from the DeLaPerriere estate. Prior to his purchase,
Stancil used the disputed property in connection with a business he
operated on the contiguous property, which he leased from the DeLaPerriere estate from 1985 until his purchase in 1999. During that time,
Stancil placed two school buses on the disputed property and also stored
automobile parts on the property. From 1971 through 1984, a prior
tenant openly, continuously, and exclusively used the parcel claimed by
Stancil. That tenant maintained the parcel, keeping it clean and
mowed. After the earlier tenant departed, Stancil fenced the disputed
property and continued its open, continuous, and exclusive use." The
special master found for Steinichen concerning three of the lots but
found that "Stancil had presented sufficient evidence to establish
adverse possession under color of title as well as prescriptive title
without color of title."' The trial court adopted the recommendation
of the special master, and Steinichen appealed.67
Steinichen contended that Stancil's prescriptive claim could not begin
to run because he had not used the property continuously.6 The
supreme court, however, affirmed the order of the trial court, holding
that "the DeLaPerriere estate possessed the [Stancil] tract from 1971 to
1999, by and through its tenants, and that possession [could] be tacked
onto Stancil's possession as owner from 1999 until the present."69
In Intown Redevelopment Alliance, LLC v. Reliance Equities, LLC,70
the Georgia Court of Appeals considered the issue of "whether fiduciary
duties generally owed between tenants in common preclude [one party]

61. Id. at 580-81, 669 S.E.2d at 110.
62. O.C.G.A. § 44-5-164 (1991).
63. O.C.G.A. § 44-5-161(1991); O.C.GA. § 44-5-163 (1991); Steinichen, 284 Ga. at 581,
669 S.E.2d at 110.
64. The matter was submitted to a special master for a hearing on the evidence and
submission of findings of fact and law to the court pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 23-3-63 (1982).
Steinichen, 284 Ga. at 581, 669 S.E.2d at 110.
65. Steinichen, 284 Ga. at 581-82, 669 S.E.2d at 110.
66. Id. at 581, 669 S.E.2d at 110.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 582, 669 S.E.2d at 111.
70. 295 Ga. App. 396, 671 S.E.2d 884 (2008).

308

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 61

from seeking foreclosure on a debt deed encumbering common property."" The underlying facts showed that four individuals acquired
property as tenants in common through a November 1988 deed. At the
time of the conveyance, the four individuals granted a deed to secure
debt to the entire property to Joyce Jones. In 1990, to avoid foreclosure
of the property, three of the four owners quitclaimed their seventy-five
percent interest in the property to Jones.72 The quitclaim deed stated
that "it was given in full satisfaction of grantor's indebtedness that
secured by the debt deed.""8
In April 2005 the county sheriff sold the property for unpaid ad
valorem taxes, and a tax deed conveyed the property to Crown Ambassador Properties, LLC. Jones, holding a seventy-five percent undivided
interest in the property, and Stephen Ogletree, holding the remaining
twenty-five percent interest, were the parties who held the right7 4 to
redeem the property from the tax deed.7" In May 2005 Jones deeded
her seventy-five percent interest in the property to Intown Redevelopment Alliance, LLC. Jones also transferred her remaining rights in the
security deed to Intown. In June 2005 Crown Ambassador transferred
its interest in the unredeemed tax deed to Intown. When Ogletree
deeded his twenty-five percent interest to Reliance Equities, LLC on July
6, 2005, Intown and Reliance became tenants in common. On July 20,
2005, Intown notified Ogletree that it was commencing foreclosure of the
property pursuant to the power of sale provisions within the security
deed. Reliance notified Intown that Reliance had acquired Ogletree's
interest and asserted that Intown owed Reliance fiduciary duties as a
tenant in common.76 Further, Reliance claimed that "neither Reliance
nor Intown could gain a [one hundred] percent interest in the property
without coming to some agreement." 77 No agreement was reached, and
Intown filed an action for declaratory judgment, seeking a determination
of its right to foreclosure on the security deed.78
The trial court granted Reliance's motion for partial summary
judgment, concluding that the fiduciary duties owed by each co-tenant
to the other precluded Intown from foreclosing the deed.79 On appeal,

71. Id. at 396, 671 S.E.2d at 885.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

Id. at 397, 671 S.E.2d at 885.
Id.
See O.C.GA. § 48-4-40 (1999).
Intown Redevelopment Alliance, 295 Ga. App. at 397, 671 S.E.2d at 885.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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the court of appeals reversed, applying an exception to the general rule
that
tenants in common sustain such a confidential relation to each other,
with respect to their interests in the common property and the common
title under which they hold, that it would be inequitable to permit one
of them, without the consent of the others, to buy an outstanding
adversary's claim to the common estate and assert it for his exclusive
benefit, to the injury or prejudice of his cotenants.80
In reversing the trial court, the court of appeals relied upon Hodgson v.
Federal Oil & Development Co., 1 in which the United States Supreme
Court observed that "the general rule does not apply [when] the interests
of the cotenants accrue at different times by different instruments and
under circumstances that show there is no good reason to recognize
mutual fiduciary duties." 2 Because Intown acquired and recorded its
interest in the property and the security deed before Reliance acquired
its interest, an adversarial relationship existed between Intown and
Reliance regarding their actual acquisition of interests thereto." The
court held that these parties "did not become cotenants in a relationship
of mutual trust and confidence with respect to interests in common
property acquired from a common source at the same time" and that
they were "cotenants in law only... with no apparent expectation of
trust or cooperation." 4 Accordingly, there existed none of the duties
typically owed from one cotenant to another.85
IV. SALE OF REAL PROPERTY
The importance of clear and valid terms in contracts for the sale of
real property continues to be an issue. In Parks v. Thompson Builders,
Inc.,' the court of appeals considered whether a contract provision
regarding forfeiture of funds could be enforced if the contract itself was
unenforceable.8 7

80. Id. at 397-98, 671 S.E.2d at 885 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
Hardin v. Council, 200 Ga. 822, 830, 38 S.E.2d 549, 555 (1946)).
81. 274 U.S. 15 (1927).
82. Intown Redevelopment Alliance, 295 Ga. App. at 398, 671 S.E.2d at 886 (citing
Hodgson, 274 U.S. at 19-20).
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. 296 Ga. App. 704, 675 S.E.2d 583 (2009).
87. Id. at 706, 675 S.E.2d at 585.
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Monica Parks signed a contract with Thompson Builders to purchase
a lot and build a home but failed to read the contract before signing
it.88 The contract "reflected a purchase price of $415,900 and stated
that Parks was to obtain a [thirty]-year loan in an amount 'TBD' (to be
determined) at an interest rate 'TBD.'" 9 Parks paid earnest money in
the amount of $16,000 after execution of the contract. In anticipation of
the construction, Parks obtained conditional loan approval, but the loan
amount was for $332,720 and not for the full $415,900 sale price. Parks
failed to read the provisions of the loan documents and did not realize
that the loan did not provide for one hundred percent financing. It was
also undisputed that the mortgage contract placed a number of duties
upon Parks that she failed to perform. Once Thompson Builders began
construction, Parks ordered and paid for upgrades and appliances
totaling approximately $6000. At no time while the home was being
constructed did Parks indicate to the builder that she could not close on
the home. The construction proceeded, and a certificate of occupancy
was obtained so that closing could take place. It was not until the
scheduled closing in July 2006 that Parks told the builder that she could
not close, and she requested the return of her earnest money. When the
money was not returned, Parks filed suit. Six months after Parks fied
suit, the lender formally notified Parks that the mortgage loan would not
be approved due to insufficient income. The builder sold the home
eighteen months later after sustaining carrying costs of over $38,000.90
The trial court directed a verdict for the builder on the grounds that
the contract was not binding because it failed to specify the loan amount
or interest rate. The trial court held that Parks was estopped from
recovering any earnest money because she did not exercise due diligence
in pursuing financing, having failed to read the contract in its entire91
ty.
The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's decision for the builder
regarding the enforceability of the contract finding its terms vague and
indefinite but reversed the trial court's decision on the issue of return of
the earnest money.92 The court held that if the contract as a whole was
unenforceable, then the provisions governing forfeiture of the earnest

88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 704-05, 675 S.E.2d at 584.
at 704, 675 S.E.2d at 584.
at 705, 675 S.E.2d at 584.
at 705-06, 675 S.E.2d at 584-85.
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money were also unenforceable, and Parks was entitled to return of the
funds.93
The court of appeals had previously stressed the importance of valid
legal descriptions in sales contracts in O'Dell v. Pine Ridge Investments,
LLC. 9 In that case, John O'Dell, the broker for the purchaser JOD
Consulting Services (collectively, O'Dell), executed an "Offer to Purchase
Real Estate" with Pine Ridge Investments.9 5 The property to be sold
was described as "187.5 acres in Land Lot 170 Sumter County Georgia
[aind containing 8,167,500 (187.5 a) square feet of land, more or less.'
O'Dell paid the earnest money required under the agreement, and a date
for the closing the sale was set with a stipulation "that the '[dieposit is
forfeited if property does not close."' 9 The closing did not occur by the
contract date. 98
O'Dell brought suit against Pine Ridge for the return of the earnest
money and for the expenses of litigation, claiming that the contract was
unenforceable because it lacked a sufficient legal description and that
the provision concerning forfeiture of the earnest money was an unlawful
penalty. Pine Ridge counterclaimed for breach of contract on account of
O'Dell's failure to close by the scheduled date, seeking the earnest money
as liquidated damages. Pine Ridge claimed that the contract was
enforceable and that the provision calling for forfeiture of the earnest
money was a lawful provision for liquidated damages. On cross-motions
for summary judgment, the trial court denied summary judgment to
O'Dell and granted summary judgment to Pine Ridge. O'Dell appealed."
On appeal, O'Dell argued that the legal description contained in the
contract was insufficient, rendering the offer contract unenforceable.
Further, O'Dell argued that the use of evidence outside the legal
description contained in the offer contract was inadmissible parol
evidence."
The court of appeals noted that "[iun the absence of a
legally sufficient description within the contract itself, a court may,
under certain circumstances, allow the introduction of parol evidence to
provide such a description."0 1 However, such parol evidence was

93. Id. (citing O'Dell v. Pine Ridge Invs., LLC, 293 Ga. App. 696, 700, 667 S.E.2d 912,
916 (2008)).
94. 293 Ga. App. 696, 700, 667 S.E.2d 912, 916 (2008).

95. Id. at 696, 667 S.E.2d at 914.
96. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
97. Id. (alteration in original).

98. Id.
99. Id. at 696-97, 667 S.E.2d at 914.

100. Id. at 697, 667 S.E.2d at 914.
101. Id.
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admissible only if "the premises are so referred to within the contract as
to indicate the seller's intention to convey a particular tract of land." °2
The contract language must provide "a 'key' that opens the door to parol
evidence." 3
The court of appeals reversed the trial court, holding that the property
description within the four corners of the contract failed to adequately
identify the property's location, there was no legal description of the
metes and bounds of the property, and there was no language that would
serve as a key to allow extrinsic parol evidence to supply the description. °4 Without such information, it was undisputed that the property
description did not satisfy the statute of frauds."°

V. EASEMENTS, COVENANTS, AND BOUNDARIES' °6
In an action to remove a cloud from a title, establish a boundary line,
and for ejectment, the court of appeals in Gibson v. Rustin °7 relied
upon a set of rules delineated in O.C.G.A. § 44-4-5'08 to aid the court
in its determination of disputed boundary lines.'09 The dispute
concerned the exact location of the boundary line joining the northeast
and southeast corners of Jesse Rustin's 70.95-acre tract of land, which
was purchased from Johnnie Whelchel in 1965.11° The deed to the
land referenced a 1965 survey that "described Rustin's property as 'taken
from a plat drawn by [Williams],'" who was the property's surveyor at
the time."1 The plat showed a spring to the east of Rustin's property
with no other landmarks or monuments referenced in the deed or plat.
Also, the four corners of Rustin's property were established by two land
lot corners and points on the southeastern and northeastern corners.'12
In 2003 Rustin had his property surveyed by John Gaston, whose
113
survey revealed a twelve-foot closure failure in the Williams survey.
Additionally, "[tihe metes and bounds on the deed's description of

102. Id.
103. I&
104.

Id. at 699-700, 667 S.E.2d at 916.

105. Id. at 698, 667 S.E.2d at 915.
106. This section was authored by Jennifer L. Ervin, Clark Atlanta University (B.A.,
2005); Northwestern University School of Law (J.D., candidate, 2010).
107. 297 Ga. App. 169, 676 S.E.2d 799 (2009).
108.

See O.C.GA § 44-4-5 (1991).

109.
110.
111.
112.
113.

Gibson, 297 Ga. App. at 176, 676 S.E.2d at 804.
Id. at 170, 676 S.E.2d at 801.
Id. (alteration in original).
Id.
Id.
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Rustin's property ... did not coincide with the calls on the fiats."" 4
Robert and Virginia Gibson and several others had purchased property
from Whelchel that adjoined Rustin's land. Many of these landowners
likewise had their properties surveyed to determine the boundary
lines." 5
By 2005 disputes arose concerning Rustin's right to build a fence and
the Gibsons' right to maintain a garden on the land. As a result, Rustin
filed a petition against the Gibsons to remove a cloud from his title and
for ejectment. In 2007 the Gibsons and the other landowners filed a
petition against Rustin seeking the same relief, but also seeking to
establish
a boundary line. The two cases were eventually consolidat116
ed.
At a bench trial, the trial court found for Rustin and enjoined the
Gibsons from trespassing on the property."7 The Gibsons subsequently appealed, contending, among other things, that the trial court's
determination of the boundary line was not properly supported by the
evidence."' The court of appeals disagreed, citing O.C.G.A. § 44-4-5,
which provides general rules for determining disputed boundary
lines."9 According to this code section, evidence offered to show the
presence of natural landmarks is most conclusive in determining
disputed boundary lines, and "[ancient or genuine landmarks such as
comer stations or marked trees ...

control the course and distances

called for by the survey."120 The statute also instructs the factfinder
on how to determine boundary lines in the absence of higher evidence
or
121
when the corners are established and the lines are not marked.
Applying the statute, the court of appeals affirmed the trial court's
decision and held that "although no natural landmarks established the
boundary, it was undisputed that the spring was not on Rustin's
property; thus ...

there was some evidence from which the factfinder

could establish the boundary lines."122 The court of appeals also
affirmed the trial court's rulings regarding the admissibility of statements made by Whelchel,'" the possible ambiguity of the description

114.

Id.

115.
116.
117.
118.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

119.
120.
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See id. (citing O.C.GA. § 444-5).
O.C.G.A. § 44-4-5(2).
See id. § 44-4-5(3).
Gibson, 297 Ga. App. at 176, 676 S.E.2d at 805.
Id. at 173, 676 S.E.2d at 803.

170-71, 676 S.E.2d at 801-02.
172, 676 S.E.2d at 802.
172-73, 676 S.E.2d at 802.
176, 676 S.E.2d at 804.
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of the disputed property in Rustin's deed,12 and the sufficiency of
evidence to show adverse possession. 5
During the survey period, several cases involving easement rights
were decided in Georgia, with issues ranging from abandonment to
reinforcement of well-established legal theories. In Mize v. McGarity,' 26 the landowners filed an action for declaratory judgment, injunctive relief, and trespass against Van and Edna Mize, claiming that the
Mizes improperly interfered with the petitioners' rights to use easements
across the Mizes' property. In 1965 the original owners of adjoining Lots
4, 5, and 6 accessed their property by boat. Later, the original owners
agreed to split the costs to build a driveway they could all use to access
their property from the public road. Because of the steep terrain on Lot
4, the original owners decided to place the driveway on Lots 5 and 6.127
At the end of the driveway were four mailboxes labeled for each of the
original owners and a large iron gate to which each owner had a key.
At one point, two of the original owners paid and arranged for the
installation of a set of concrete stairs that gave them easier access from
their property to the lake."2
By 1994 Lots 5 and 6 had been sold to the Mizes, and Lot 4 was
deeded to the petitioners. When the petitioners asked the Mizes to grant
an easement in the joint driveway, the Mizes refused. However, the
Mizes continued to allow the petitioners to use the driveway. The Mizes
later removed the concrete stairs that allowed for easier access to the
lake and planted several trees across the roadway that the petitioners
used to access the driveway. In response, the petitioners filed their
claims.129
Following a bench trial, the trial court found for the petitioners and
granted them the irrevocable easement rights they sought according to
O.C.G.A. § 44-9-4,13° among other relief. 31

On appeal, the Mizes

124. Id. at 175, 676 S.E.2d at 804.
125. Id. at 175-76, 676 S.E.2d at 804.
126. 293 Ga. App. 714, 667 S.E.2d 695 (2008).
127. Id. at 714-15, 667 S.E.2d at 697.
128. Id. at 715, 667 S.E.2d at 697.
129. Id. at 716, 667 S.E.2d at 698.
130. O.C.G.A. § 44-9-4 (2002). This section provides that [a] parol license is not
revocable when the licensee has acted pursuant thereto and in so doing has incurred

expense." Id. When the parol license is not revocable, "it becomes an easement running
with the land." Id. The court in Mize recognized the Georgia Supreme Court's holding that
"'[t]he principle embodied in this section is that [the use of the easement] must necessarily
be preceded by the expenditure of money.'" 293 Ga. App. at 717, 667 S.E.2d at 698 (first
alteration in original) (quoting Miller v. Slater, 182 Ga. 552, 558, 186 S.E. 413, 416 (1936)).
131. Mize, 293 Ga. App. at 716, 667 S.E.2d at 698.
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challenged the trial court's holding on several grounds. First, the Mizes
argued that according to O.C.G.A. § 44-9-4, the petitioners' actual use of
the joint driveway was not preceded by the expenditure of money to
maintain the easement.132 The court of appeals disagreed, holding
that such use occurred because the original owners shared equally in the
costs associated with the initial and subsequent clearing and grading of
the driveway."' The court also noted that the petitioners expended
money for concrete pads that comprised the roadway-an action clearly
in the purview of O.C.G.A. § 44-9-4.14

Second, the court of appeals recognized that as subsequent purchasers,
the Mizes could not be burdened with the easement if they had no notice
of the easement when they took possession of their property.13 The
Mizes argued that they had no such notice, but the court disagreed."3
The court held that a "'reasonably prudent person'" would have observed
that the petitioners' use of the easement was open and obvious.'37 The
court noted that the presence of clearly labeled mailboxes for the owners
of each of the adjoining lots and a large iron gate, all at the end of the
driveway, demonstrated open and obvious use. 3 ' Furthermore, the
court explained that the petitioners "were openly using the driveway and
roadbed at and after the time the Mizes acquired their property."3 9
Third, the Mizes argued that the petitioners abandoned their rights
to the easement because of non-use.' 40 The court of appeals, however,
recognized that although the right to an easement can be lost by nonuse, such forfeiture "'will not be incurred unless the non-use[] [is] for a
period sufficient to raise the presumption of a release or abandonment.'"141 Although the petitioners used their homes only on the
weekends or for vacations, the court noted that they also used the
driveway and roadway while there. 142 Thus, the court
held that even
143
such sparing use did not constitute abandonment.

132. Id. at 717, 667 S.E.2d at 699.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 718, 667 S.E.2d at 699.
136. Id.
137. Id. (quoting Lowe's Home Ctrs., Inc. v. Garrison Ridge Shopping Ctr. Marietta,
Ga., L.P., 283 Ga. App. 854, 856, 643 S.E.2d 288, 291 (2007)).
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 719, 667 S.E.2d at 699.
141. Id. (first alteration in original) (quoting Mathis v. Holcomb, 215 Ga. 488, 489, 111
S.E.2d 50, 52 (1959)).
142. Id., 667 S.E.2d at 699-700.
143. Id., 667 S.E.2d at 700.
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Finally, the court of appeals also disagreed with the Mizes' contentions
that stairway easements are intended for the purpose of ingress and
egress only and that the petitioners' right to enter and exit the property
was not prohibited by the Mizes' removal of the concrete stairs.1 "
In an action seeking a declaration of easement rights and injunctive
relief, the court of appeals in Pleasure Bluff Dock Club, Inc. v. Poston' " held that the defendant developers had presented sufficient
evidence for a ruling that the plaintiff homeowners had abandoned a
natural landing easement.'" In this case, Pleasure Bluff subdivision
had been developed in 1948 along the Julington River, where subdivision
developers acquired numerous lots, as well as St. Julington Boulevard,
"a [one hundred]-foot-wide strip of land running between several lots and
the river's low water mark."14 7 The subdivision plat designated St.
Julington Boulevard as a private road, but the developers maintained
ownership of the property. 4"
When the developers began selling the subdivision lots, they also
granted the purchasers the right of ingress and egress along the private
road.149 That road was never paved, and over time, "a narrow dirt
road measuring slightly over nine feet wide developed within [the]
original [one hundred]-foot expanse."" 0 Additionally, certain purchasers held deeds that granted them access to a natural boat landing, which
was later replaced by a common dock that the community built.
However, the river's marsh eventually filled in the landing area, and the
community stopped using it altogether.'"
One set of developers, Robert and Linda Poston, owned two adjacent
subdivision lots along the river. St. Julington Boulevard (the nine-foot
dirt road) and the landing area both fronted the Postons' property.
When the Postons decided to build a private dock, they obtained
quitclaim deeds to the one hundred-foot-wide St. Julington Boulevard,
which included the nine-foot dirt road. In response, the homeowners
sued, seeking to establish their easement rights in the entire one
hundred-foot expanse of St. Julington Boulevard. The trial court
referred the case to a special master.'8 2 The special master concluded
that "the Postons had a fee simple interest in the portion of St. Julington

144.
145.
146.
147.
148.

Id.
294 Ga. App. 318, 670 S.E.2d 128 (2008).
Id. at 320, 670 S.E.2d at 130.
Id. at 318, 670 S.E.2d at 129.
Id.

149.
150.

Id. at 319, 670 S.E.2d at 129.
Id. (emphasis omitted).

151. Id.
152. Id.
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Boulevard that fronted their property," but the homeowners had the
limited easement right of "ingress and egress along the 9.2-foot-wide dirt
road.""
The special master also determined that the homeowners'
rights to the landing had been abandoned altogether."M
The homeowners appealed, claiming that "because their original
property deeds granted them easement rights" to use the entire one
hundred-foot expanse of St. Julington Boulevard, as well as the landing,
those rights could "never be extinguished or lost.""'5 Therefore, they
contended that the special master improperly reduced their easement
based on abandonment and non-use.'6 The court of appeals disagreed,
explaining that the evidence demonstrated the homeowners' intent to
abandon these properties.'5 7 Specifically, intent to abandon was
demonstrated by the community's building of a new deck, the overgrown
marsh, and testimony admitting that the full use of the one hundredfoot-wide expanse was not required for the homeowners' reasonable use
and enjoyment.5 8
In de Castro v. Durrell,59 the court of appeals refused to expand the
concept of quasi-easements in Georgia." ° In this case, Lots 1, 2, 3,
and 4 were originally part of a 3.9-acre tract of land, which historically
was used for several activities, including soccer. When the land was
conveyed to Thomas and Martha Shim, the Shims continued to allow
soccer activities on the land.' 6' However, "[tihere were no recorded
covenants 62or contractual restrictions upon the Shims' use of the
"1
property.

Years later, the Shims decided to divide the tract of land into four lots,
designating Lot 1 as a soccer field. John de Castro and Carolyn Cash
purchased Lot 4, which was conveyed to them by a warranty deed that
incorporated a "Declaration of Easement Agreement.""e That agreement created a "Recreation Easement Area" on "a [twenty]-foot strip of
land spanning the rear of Lots 3 and 4 'for the benefit of the owner of
Lot 1, and as a burden upon Lots 3 and 4 ...

for the conduct of

recreational activities thereon, including, but not limited to use of said

153. Id.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.

Id.
Id. at 319-20, 670 S.E.2d at 129.
Id.
Id. at 320, 670 S.E.2d at 129-30.
Id. at 319-20, 670 S.E.2d at 129-30.
295 Ga. App. 194, 671 S.E.2d 244 (2008).
Id. at 199, 671 S.E.2d at 249.
Id. at 195, 671 S.E.2d at 247.
Id.
Id. at 195-96, 671 S.E.2d at 247.
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easement area as part of a soccer field. '""
The declaration also
required the owner of Lot 1 to manage, maintain, operate, and improve
the recreation easement area, and the declaration could not be amended
without the consent of all the lot owners. The declaration did not,
however, provide the owners of Lots 3 and 4 with reciprocal rights to use
Lot 1.16

A few years later, Amy Durrell and Russell Currey bought Lots 1 and
2, and David Oedel bought Lot 3. The warranty deeds to Lots 1, 2, and
3 each included the final recorded plat and the declaration.'" When
Durrell ceased allowing the community to access the soccer field on Lot
1, the owners of Lots 3 and 4 sued, seeking a declaratory judgment as
well as injunctive and monetary relief. De Castro, Cash, and Oedel
claimed they had quasi-easement rights in the soccer field. At trial, the
court granted Durrell's motion for summary
judgment on all claims, and
1 67
de Castro, Cash, and Oedel appealed.
In their first argument on appeal, de Castro, Cash, and Oedel argued
that they had established all of the elements necessary to prove the
existence of a quasi-easement."
They argued that a quasi-easement
arose pursuant to Georgia law "when the Shims partitioned the property
in such a way that [Durrell and Currey] were benefitted as well as
burdened."169 However, the court of appeals disagreed, noting that the
focus of this inquiry is the prior benefit. 7 0 Accordingly, the court
noted that the declaration, which was recorded before partition, created
a benefit to the Lot 1 owners but no benefit for the owners of Lots 3 and
4.171 Additionally, the court noted that the special stipulation, intending to establish an easement for the benefit of Lot 3, was not record72
ed. 1
Finally, the court observed that a quasi-easement is created "only in
instances where an implied easement is necessary to provide water or
other essential services to one parcel of property after partition of the
tract by the developer or other common owner." 1 73 After analyzing de
Castro, Cash, and Oedel's additional claims of implied easement,
prescriptive easement, estoppel, and public dedication, the court affirmed

164.

Id. at 196, 671 S.E.2d at 247 (second alteration in original).
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the trial court's
granting of Durrell and Currey's motion for summary
174

judgment.

In DeSarno v. Jam Golf Management, LLC, 171 the court of appeals
clarified the definition of excessive use in the context of interpreting the
scope of easement rights. 17 1 In this case, "the owner of a large tract
of land (which the owner intended to develop into residential lots) agreed
to subject those lots to an easement in favor of adjacent property being
developed as a golf course." 77

The written and recorded easement

permitted "'golf balls unintentionally to come upon the Lot.... and for
Golfers at reasonable times and in a reasonable manner to come upon
178
the exterior portions of a Lot ... to retrieve errant golf balls.''
Further, the easement provided that "'[u nder no circumstances shall the
... Golf Course Owner ...

be held liable for any damage or injury

resulting from errant golf balls or the exercise of these easements.'"179
Five years later, James and Susan DeSarno contemplated purchasing
one of the lots and were made aware that the lot was subject to the golf
ball easement. Without consulting anyone from the golf course about
their anticipated purchase, the DeSarnos purchased the lot. 8 ° They
received "a deed that expressly stated the conveyance was subject to all
easements of record affecting the lot."81 As time passed, the golf
course's business dramatically increased as did the number of errant golf
balls coming into the DeSarnos' yard. Because of the errant golf balls,
the DeSarnos suffered significant property damage, and they prohibited
their children from playing in the yard for safety reasons.8 2
As a result, the DeSarnos sued the golf course operators for trespass,
nuisance, and the damage to their property. The trial court, however,
granted summary judgment to the golf course operators, and the
DeSarnos appealed."ss On appeal, the court held that the language of
the easement "explicitly permitted the complained-of conduct and ...
exonerated the golf course owner from any liability for damages caused
by the errant golf balls.""s Therefore, the court held that "no claim for

174.
175.
176.
177.

Id. at 199-202, 671 S.E.2d at 249-51.
295 Ga. App. 70, 670 S.E.2d 889 (2008).
See id. at 72-74, 670 S.E.2d at 892.
Id. at 71, 670 S.E.2d at 889.

178. Id. (alterations in original).
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trespass or nuisance could be maintained."1" Moreover, the court
noted that the DeSarnos bought the property with full knowledge of the
easement. '6
The court of appeals also rejected the DeSarnos' argument "that the
extremely large number of errant golf balls coming onto their property
constituted an 'excessive use' of the easement (and therefore a nuisance)."187 In rejecting their argument, the court noted that "the
concept of 'excessive use' of an easement relates not to the number of
times an easement is used but rather to a use of the easement that
exceeds the scope of the easement or that is intended to benefit a
property that is not the dominant estate."1 Furthermore, the court
noted that unless there is a limit set forth in the easement, the
easement holder may use the easement as many times as it chooses
without fear of liability to the fee owner."8 9
Notably, because the easement did not expressly relieve golfers of
liability for damage caused by the errant golf balls,' the DeSarnos
may have had a cause of action against the golfers. Neither the trial
court nor the appellate court, however, discussed this possibility.
VI.

TRESPASS AND NUISANCE1 91

Although not the primary inquiry on appeal, the difference between a
permanent nuisance and a continuing nuisance in the context of the
applicable statute of limitations was explained by the supreme court in
City of Atlanta v. Kleber.92 The homeowners in that case brought an
action for negligence and nuisance against the City of Atlanta and a
railroad company, claiming that the city and the railroad company failed
to properly maintain a drainage pipe and culvert near the homeowners'
property.193

At various times over the span of two centuries, the railroad company
installed railroad tracks, a culvert, and a thirty-six-inch drainage pipe
on property that was eventually owned by the homeowners. At the time
of their installations, the culvert and the pipe were adequate to drain

185. Id.
186. Id., 670 S.E.2d at 891.
187.

Id.

188. Id. at 73, 670 S.E.2d at 891.
189. Id.
190. See id. at 71, 670 S.E.2d at 889-90.
191. This section was authored by Jennifer L. Ervin, Clark Atlanta University (B.A.,
2005); Northwestern University School of Law (J.D., candidate, 2010).
192. 285 Ga. 413, 416, 677 S.E.2d 134, 137 (2009).
193. Id. at 413, 677 S.E.2d at 135.
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the thirty-seven-acre basin where the homeowners' property sat.
However, by the time the homeowners purchased the property in the
summer of 1997, heavy rains consistently resulted in damaging floods to
the property. T fix the flooding problem, the homeowners contacted the
city and the railroad company, but the homeowners received no
response. As a result, the homeowners sued the city for nuisance and
the railroad company for negligence and nuisance.19'
Based on the findings of a special master, the trial court granted
summary judgment to the city and the railroad company. 95 However,
the court of appeals reversed, holding "that the nuisance about which
the homeowners complained was continuing in nature and, as a result,
.. was not barred by the four-year statute of limitations."' 9 The case
was subsequently appealed to the Georgia Supreme Court.197 There,
the issues on appeal were
(1) whether the [clourt of [aippeals erred in concluding that the
homeowners presented triable issues with respect to their negligence
and nuisance claims against [the railroad company] and (2) whether
the [clourt of [alppeals erred in concluding that the homeowners
presented a triable issue with respect to their nuisance claim against
the [c]ity 1.'9
As an initial matter, the supreme court expressed its disagreement
with the court of appeals decision that the type of nuisance at issue was
continuous in nature, noting that such a determination "directly controls
the manner in which the statute of limitations will be applied to the
underlying claim.""9 Accordingly, the court stated that the damage or
destruction caused by "'[a] nuisance, permanent and continuing in its
character... gives but one right of action, which accrues immediately
upon the creation of the nuisance, and against which the statute of
limitations begins ... to run.' 2' o
On the other hand, the court
explained,
[when] a nuisance is not permanent in its character, but is one [that]
can and should be abated by the person erecting or maintaining it,
every continuance of the nuisance is a fresh nuisance for which a fresh
action will lie. This action accrues at the time of such continuance,
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Id. at 414, 677 S.E.2d at 135-36.
Id., 677 S.E.2d at 135.
Id.
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199. Id. at 415-16, 677 S.E.2d at 136-37.
200. Id. at 416,677 S.E.2d at 137 (quoting City Council of Augusta v. Lombard, 101 Ga.
724, 727, 28 S.E. 994, 994 (1897)).
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and against it the statute of limitations runs only from the time of such
accrual. 1

Under this standard, the court held that to the extent that the homeowners claimed that the mere presence of the culvert and pipe created
a nuisance, the homeowners' nuisance claims were permanent in nature
and were barred by the statute of limitations. 2 However, "to the
extent that the homeowners contend[ed] that the culvert and drainage
pipe ha[d] not been properly maintained,"those claims were continuous
in nature and were not barred by the statute of limitations.2" Finally,
the court reviewed the factual findings entered by the special master to
decide on the primary issues before it on appeal. 2
20 5

VII. FORECLOSURE OF REAL PROPERTY
Confirmation of foreclosure pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 44-14-161206 was
a popular topic for the court of appeals during the survey period. In
Iwan Renovations, Inc. v. North Atlanta National Bank,"°7 the borrower obtained two mortgage loans secured by the same property. The
security deeds evidencing the loans were executed seven months apart,
but the proceeds from both loans were used to finance the renovation of
the secured property. Upon default, the lender filed a lawsuit and
sought to recover the amount owed on both promissory notes. While the
lawsuit was pending, the lender initiated a nonjudicial foreclosure of the
property pursuant to the power of sale provision in its first-priority
security deed. After the foreclosure sale occurred, the lender amended
its complaint to reflect the fact that it was now seeking to recover solely
the amount owed pursuant to its second-priority security deed.2 °8 The
borrower objected, arguing that the "amended complaint was the
equivalent of a claim for a deficiency judgment."2" The trial court
denied the argument, and the borrower appealed.210
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Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (alteration in original) (quoting Lombard,
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The court of appeals overturned the ruling of the trial court.211 The
court of appeals concluded that the debts held by the bank were
inextricably intertwined,212 stating that "two debts that are incurred
for the same purpose, secured by the same property, held by the same
creditor, and owed by the same debtor are inextricably intertwined."213
Because the two debts were inextricably intertwined, the court concluded
that an attempt to recover under the promissory note evidencing the
unforeclosed second priority mortgage loan constituted a deficiency
action.214 Because the bank had not confirmed the foreclosure sale
under O.C.G.A. § 44-14-161, which is an absolute prerequisite for
seeking a deficiency judgment, the bank's lawsuit was barred.2 5
In CartersvilleDevelopers, LLC v. Georgia Bank & Trust, 216 the court
of appeals addressed the proper standard for evaluating the purchase
price obtained at foreclosure in the context of an action to confirm the
foreclosure sale.217 The confirmation statute requires that in order to
preserve the right to seek a deficiency judgment after foreclosure,
foreclosed property must be sold for its "true market value."21" Failure
to sell a property for at least its true market value bars the foreclosing
entity from confirming the sale or seeking a deficiency judgment.2 19
At the confirmation hearing in Cartersville Developers, the lender
presented an appraiser's testimony on the market value of the properties
at issue. The appraiser testified that he had calculated the value of each
property and then deducted $10,000 from the value of each property
because the properties were in foreclosure. The borrower contended that
the $10,000 discount was inappropriate. 220 The trial court rejected the
argument and applied a "shock the conscience" standard, whereby the
confirmation would only be denied if the "disparity between the
foreclosure sale price and the true market value" shocked the "judicial
conscience. "

2

1

The court of appeals overturned the trial court's rulings

on these issues.222
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212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.

Id., 673 S.E.2d at 635-36.
Id. at 128, 673 S.E.2d at 635.
Id. at 129, 673 S.E.2d at 635-36.
Id., 673 S.E.2d at 636.
292 Ga. App. 375, 664 S.E.2d 783 (2008).
Id. at 375, 664 S.E.2d at 784.
See O.C.G.A. § 44-14-161(b).
See id.
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Id. at 376, 664 S.E.2d at 785.
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First, the court of appeals noted that the shock the conscience
standard applies to lawsuits that seek to set aside a foreclosure sale, not
to confirmation actions. 2" Although the trial court based its use of the
standard in the confirmation context on an earlier court of appeals case,
Darby & Associates v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corp.,2 the court of
appeals held that the Darby decision had been impliedly overruled.2"
The court concluded that the shock the conscience standard is no longer
applicable to confirmation actions, and the trial court erred in applying
it.22 The court also concluded that "[tirue market value 'is the price
that the property will bring when it is offered for sale by one who is not
obligated, but has the desire to sell it.'" 227 Because a foreclosure does
not involve a willing seller acting under usual market conditions, the
court held that the effect of the foreclosure status of a property cannot
be utilized in determining its true market value. 2' As a result, the
court concluded that the lender's appraiser erred in applying a discount
to the value based on the property's foreclosure status. 229 Because
there was no other evidence from which a court could conclude that the
properties sold for their true market value, the court of appeals
overturned the confirmation order and remanded the case to the trial
court for further proceedings. 30
In Nash v. Compass Bank,2 3' the court of appeals again addressed
the proper standard for property valuation in the context of a confirmation action. In this case, the lender's appraiser testified that she
obtained the true market value of the property in part by deducting
value from the property to account for the cost of completion and by
deducting additional value to account for lost rent during the time period
in which those particular units were being completed. The appraiser's
testimony in this regard was based in part on communications with
another appraiser, who advised her on the evaluation. The borrower
objected to the appraiser's testimony on two grounds. First, the
borrower argued that the testimony constituted inadmissible hearsay
because it was based in part on the opinions of an appraiser not present

223. Id. at 377, 664 S.E.2d at 785-86.
224. 141 Ga. App. 78, 232 S.E.2d 615 (1977).
225. CartersvilleDevelopers, 292 Ga. App. at 377, 664 S.E.2d at 786.
226. Id. at 378, 664 S.E.2d at 786.
227. Id. at 377, 664 S.E.2d at 785 (quoting Wilson v. Prudential Indus. Props., LLC,
276 Ga. App. 180, 180 n.1, 622 S.E.2d 890, 891 n.1 (2005)).
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. See id. at 378, 664 S.E.2d at 786.
231. 296 Ga. App. 874, 676 S.E.2d 28 (2009).
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at the confirmation hearing. 2 The court of appeals disagreed with
this argument. 23 3 Although witnesses may "not act as a conduit for the
opinions of others," the court concluded that because the testifying
appraiser was personally involved in each step of the appraisal and was
accepted by all parties as an expert on real estate valuation, her reliance
on the advice of another appraiser did not bar her testimony.'
The borrower also challenged the appraiser's testimony based on the
deductions the appraiser applied to the property's value.'
The
borrower argued that the loss of rental income was "a collateral expense
analogous to closing costs," which should not have been included in the
property's market value."6 The court again disagreed, holding that
because a property without tenants is worth less to a potential purchaser
than an occupied property, the testimony regarding the loss of rental
income was clearly relevant to the issue of the property's true market
7
value.

23

Finally, the borrower argued that because the appraiser was not
qualified as a construction expert, her testimony regarding the cost to
complete the property was inappropriate. 8 Although the court noted
that this was a close question, it concluded that because the appraiser's
opinion was based on more than sheer speculation, there was some
evidence to support the trial court's order upholding the appraiser's
evaluation."3
The court thus affirmed the trial court's decision
confirming the foreclosure sale.240
One important case this year not involving confirmation or property
valuation was FederalHome Loan Mortgage Corp. v. City of Atlanta.24 1
In that case, Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac)
owned property by virtue of a prior foreclosure sale. The City of Atlanta
maintained that it possessed a lien on the property that survived the
foreclosure and was enforceable against Freddie Mac because of an
unpaid water bill incurred by the prior owner.242

232. Id. at 874-76, 676 S.E.2d at 29-30.
233. Id. at 876, 676 S.E.2d at 30.

234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 876-77, 676 S.E.2d at 30-31.
Id. at 877, 676 S.E.2d at 31.
Id.
Id.
285 Ga. 189, 674 S.E.2d 905 (2009).

242. Id. at 189-90, 674 S.E.2d at 906.
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The city based its claim on section 154-120 of the Atlanta, Georgia,
Code of Ordinances,243 which states that unpaid water bills constitute
automatic liens by operation of law.244 The city also contended that
these liens survived foreclosure."5 Freddie Mac argued that the
ordinance was preempted by O.C.G.A. § 36-60-17,246 which, inter alia,
bars municipalities from imposing a lien for unpaid water service when
the owner of the property was not the person who incurred the
charges." Freddie Mac filed its lawsuit in the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Georgia. The district court, in turn,
sought guidance from the Georgia Supreme Court. 24 In its opinion,
the supreme court addressed two specific questions certified by the
district court: (1) whether the statute preempted the ordinance, and (2)
whether the statute "prohibit[ed] a municipality from retaining, as well
as imposing, a lien on residential property.., when the property is no
longer owned by the person who incurred the charges."249
The supreme court ultimately concluded that the statute did not
preempt the ordinance and that the statute did not preclude the city
from retaining and enforcing a water lien against a subsequent property
owner.250 In so doing, the supreme court noted that cases predating
the statute held that a municipal lien could arise by operation of law
when a water bill went unpaid, and the resulting lien was analogous to
a lien for ad valorem taxes because it survived foreclosure. 251 The
court then concluded that the statute is "a limited legislative modification" that only affects situations in which the party incurring the water
bill was not the owner of the property at the time the lien arose.252
When the charges are incurred by an owner of the property, the court
concluded that the statute does not affect existing case law holding that
the lien is a "heightened-status" lien that survives foreclosure. 25 3 Thus,
the court concluded that the lien at issue was enforceable against
Freddie Mac. 25' The practical effect of this decision is that foreclosure
purchasers will almost always be liable for unpaid water bills incurred

243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.

ATLANTA, GA., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 154-120 (Municode through Aug. 25, 2009).
Id. § 154-120(1).
Fed. Home Loan Mortgage Corp., 285 Ga. at 190, 674 S.E.2d at 906.
O.C.G.A. § 36-60-17 (2006).
Id. § 36-60-17(c).
Fed. Home Loan Mortgage Corp., 285 Ga. at 189, 674 S.E.2d at 905-06.
Id., 674 S.E.2d at 906.
Id. at 193-94, 674 S.E.2d at 908-09.
Id. at 191-92, 674 S.E.2d at 907-08.
Id. at 193, 674 S.E.2d at 908.
Id.

254. Id. at 194, 674 S.E.2d at 909.
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pre-foreclosure. As a result, it is of critical importance for any potential
property bidder to contact the municipal water provider to determine
whether a water bill on the property is overdue.

VIII.

TAXATION OF REAL PROPERTY

The purchase of property at tax sales and the redemption of such
properties pursuant to statute"6 continues to be a hot topic each year.
This survey period was no exception. In Washington v. McKibbon Hotel
Group, Inc.,' the supreme court addressed whether, between competing tax deed purchasers, actual possession of property trumped
compliance with the statutory requirement for redemption. 7
Vernita Kearse originally had record title to a parcel but lost the
property in 1982 for nonpayment of taxes at which time Charles Layton
obtained title to the property by tax deed. Layton also lost the property
in 1984 for unpaid taxes, and the title to the property was conveyed by
tax deed to Johnnie Mae Shedrick. Thereafter, Shedrick also failed to
pay ad valorem taxes, and the property was conveyed to Alvin Washington by tax deed in 1990. McKibbon Hotel Group, Inc., which owned the
property contiguous to the former Kearse property, purchased Layton's
interest in 2006. In 2007 McKibbon brought a quiet title action,
claiming the property through the right of redemption, which it acquired
through purchase.' 8 Washington claimed title to the property by his
purchase of the 1990 tax deed and what he purported was foreclosure of
the equity right of redemption pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 48-4-45.259
Alternatively, Washington claimed title to the property through ripening
of the tax deed by prescription. 260 The trial court adopted the recommendation of the special master, which vested fee simple title in McKib261
bon.
Although Washington claimed that he took all the steps necessary to
bar the equity right of redemption of the tax deed,262 the trial court
found that
the documentary record is silent as to any actions taken by him in this
regard and, even if that were not so, he still failed to set out all of the

255. See O.C.G.A. §§ 48-4-40 to -48 (1999 & Supp. 2009).

256. 284 Ga. 262, 664 S.E.2d 201 (2008).
257. Id. at 262-63, 664 S.E.2d at 202.

258. Id.
259.
260.

O.C.G.A. § 48-4-45 (1999 & Supp. 2009).
Washington, 284 Ga. at 262-63, 664 S.E.2d at 202.

261. Id.
262. Id.
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requisite requirements for a barment, such as notice to any occupants
of the property and all persons with any interest of record.3
Specifically, the trial court found that Washington had failed to record
an affidavit or other document "memorializing the successful completion
of the foreclosure of the right of redemption."2
The supreme court
concluded that this failure alone, regardless of whether Washington took
the steps to foreclose the right of redemption, was sufficient to preclude
his interest.26 Therefore, McKibbon took its interest in the property
with notice only that Washington held a defeasible title to the property,
subject to the equity bar of redemption.26
The supreme court then addressed Washington's claim to the property
by prescription.2 7" The court stated that "for a tax deed title to ripen
by prescription into fee simple title," the claimant must prove "adverse
possession ... for a period of four years."2
Although the court
recognized that Washington met three of the four requirements of
adverse possession, because he could not prove that his possession was
"public, continuous, exclusive, uninterrupted, and peaceable," his claim
under a theory of prescriptive title also failed.269
270
In Fulton County Board of Tax Assessors v. National Biscuit Co.,
the Fulton County Board of Tax Assessors appraised and assessed
National Biscuit Company's (NBC) commercial property at a fair market
value of $7,469,500 for the 2005 tax year. In response, NBC commissioned a private appraisal that valued the property at $4,200,000. NBC
then appealed the assessed value to the county's board of equalization.
The board of equalization valued the property at $5,196,360, and NBC
appealed to the superior court. Following a bench trial, even though the
superior court found that the tax assessors proved a value of $5,650,000,
the court concluded that the property value could not exceed that set by
the board of equalization. The tax assessors appealed on the ground
that the superior court erred in limiting the property's assessed value to
the lower amount set by the board of equalization.2 7'

263. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
264. Id.
265. Id. at 263-64, 664 S.E.2d at 202-03.
266. Id., 664 S.E.2d at 203.
267. Id. at 264, 664 S.E.2d at 203.
268. Id. (citing O.C.GA § 48-4-48(b)).
269. Id. at 264-65, 664 S.E.2d at 203-04 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
O.C.G.A. § 44-5-161(aX3) (1991)).
270. 296 Ga. App. 884, 676 S.E.2d 41 (2009).
271. Id. at 884, 676 S.E.2d at 42.
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On appeal the court relied upon O.C.G.A. § 48-5-311(g)(3), 27 2 which
provides that in tax appeals to the superior court, "'[tihe appeal shall
constitute a de novo action.'"2 7 3 Therefore, the superior court "was
required to exercise its independent judgment in valuing the property,4
without being bound by ... the board of equalization's findings."1
The court of appeals also noted that the statute "contemplates that the
final determination of value on appeal can be greater than the valuation
set by the board of equalization."'75 Accordingly, the court held that
if the county tax assessor met its burden of "proving a particular value
by the preponderance of the evidence at the de novo trial, the court was
authorized to enter its valuation determination and judgment in the
amount so proven. " "
In Morton v. Glynn County Board of Tax Assessors,277 the court of

appeals considered whether membership in a private club enhanced the
value of real property so as to increase the assessed value of the
property.2 7 William and Daisy Morton and other similarly situated
taxpayers appealed the 2002 assessments of their properties located on
Sea Island, arguing that the county board of tax assessors improperly
included the value of their memberships in the exclusive Sea Island Club
in the assessments of their real properties. The evidence was that the
Sea Island Company created the private club and limited access to
guests of the Cloister, the guests of the Sea Island Resort, and those who
purchased property from the Sea Island Company. The Sea Island
Company intended for the limited membership to increase property
values on the island. The Mortons contended that the membership
constituted nontaxable, intangible personal property. The appeal of the
assessments progressed through the tax assessors' office to the board of
equalization, and then to the superior court.2 7 9 The superior court
granted summary judgment to the tax assessors on the ground that "the
value of the [taxpayers'] real property had been enhanced by immediate
access to a [cilub membership, [and] that enhanced value must be
included in the appraisal for ad valorem tax."28°

272. O.C.GA § 48-5-311(g)(3) (1999 & Supp. 2009).
273. Nat'i Biscuit Co., 296 Ga. App. at 884, 676 S.E.2d at 42 (alteration in original)
(quoting O.C.GA. § 48-5-311(g)(3)).
274. Id. at 885, 676 S.E.2d at 43.
275. Id.
276. Id.
277. 294 Ga. App. 901, 670 S.E.2d 528 (2008).

278. Id. at 901, 670 S.E.2d at 529.
279. Id. at 901-02, 670 S.E.2d at 529.
280. Id. at 903, 670 S.E.2d at 530.
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The court of appeals considered whether "the value of the membership
[was] distinct and severable from the fair market value of the real
property" and whether "the memberships themselves [were] intangible
personal property."2"' The court held that the assessments did not
improperly include an intangible benefit in assessing the properties' fair
market values because the tax assessors based the appraisals on the
amount "buyers are prepared to pay for real property with the right to
apply for [club] membership attached.""2s The court noted that it
would be inequitable to force the tax assessors to reduce the fair market
value of these properties when the Sea Island Club policies enchanced
the value of the properties by allowing a buyer and seller to arrange for
the seller to turn in his or her membership so that the buyer is at the
top of the membership waiting list.m
The court recognized the
distinction that
[the] properties sell at an enhanced value, not because they include a
membership, but because the seller agrees to arrange that the buyer
will have preferential eligibility for an available membership. It is this
enhanced value, not the value of the membership itself, that is included
in the county's appraisals.2
Further, if a member resigns independently to the sale of property,
independent buyers receive no preferential treatment because "[tihis
right cannot be transferred outside the property and thus is coexistent
with it."' Therefore, the court concluded that the membership, being
a part of the enhanced value paid by a purchaser for the
property, could
26
be included in the assessed tax value of the property. 8
IX.

CONDEMNATION

7

In Gramm v. City of Stockbridge,2 s the City of Stockbridge filed a
petition for condemnation to acquire property owned by Marilyn
Gramm. 9 The special master granted the city's petition and awarded

281. Id.
282. Id. at 904, 670 S.E.2d at 531.
283. Id. at 905, 670 S.E.2d at 531.
284. Id.
285. Id.
286. Id.
287. This section was authored by Jonathan E. Green, associate in the firm of Baker,
Donelson, Bearman, Caldwell & Berkowitz, PC. Vanderbilt University (B.A, 1998);
University of Georgia School of Law (J.D., cum laude, 2001). Member, State Bar of
Georgia.
288. 297 Ga. App. 165, 676 S.E.2d 818 (2009).
289. Id. at 165, 676 S.E.2d at 819.
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Gramm $430,000 in compensation for the value of the condemned
property. The superior court adopted the special master's findings.
Subsequently, the money for the condemnation was deposited into the
court registry and then paid to Gramm. Gramm, in turn, filed an appeal
seeking a jury trial on the issue of damages.'
While the trial was pending, the city determined that it no longer
needed the property for its planned redevelopment and dismissed the
action. The city then fied a quitclaim deed transferring the real
property back to Gramm and filed a claim seeking a return of the
$430,000 paid to Gramm, plus interest. Gramm, in turn, fied a motion
to set aside the city's dismissal. The superior court denied the motion
to set aside the dismissal but granted Gramm's application for an
interlocutory appeal.29 1
The
The court of appeals reversed the superior court's dismissal.'
court of appeals first held that title had vested in the city upon the
superior court's entry of a condemnation judgment and the payment of
an award to Gramm.29 3 Noting that Gramm had challenged the
amount of the award, not the validity of the taking, the city's title was
conclusive and could not be re-litigated.2 9
The city argued that O.C.G.A. § 22-1-2(c)(1)295 and O.C.G.A. § 22-11221 justified its actions. 7 But these statutes, enacted as part 29of8
the Landowner's Bill of Rights and Private Property Protection Act,
were not applicable because the condemnation action had originally been
filed in November 2005, which was before the effective date of the
statutes.299 The court of appeals also distinguished Gatefield Corp. v.
Gwinnett County3"° from the present case.30 ' In Gatefield Corp., the
court of appeals held that the condemnor was permitted to set aside a
judgment of condemnation because of a mistake.3 2 The condemnor
filed the condemnation action on the wrong property due to an error by

290. Id.

291. Id. at 165-66, 676 S.E.2d at 819.
292. Id. at 168, 676 S.E.2d at 821.
293. Id. at 166, 676 S.E.2d at 820.
294. Id.
295. O.C.G.A. § 22-1-2(c)(1) (Supp. 2009).
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Gramm, 297 Ga. App. at 167, 676 S.E.2d at 820.
234 Ga. App. 621, 507 S.E.2d 164 (1998).
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its surveyor.'
In the present case, however, the court observed that
the city did not identify an error causing it to erroneously file the
condemnation petition. 3°" The court also observed that the equities of
the situation pointed to upholding the condemnation. 5 The court reasoned that a contrary finding would require a condemnee to retain
condemnation proceeds in case the condemnor sought to reverse the
condemnation, thus creating uncertainty for the condemnee. 30'
In Georgia Department of Transportation v. Bowles,' 7 the Georgia
Department of Transportation (DOT) initiated a condemnation proceeding under O.C.G.A. § 32-3-48°s against property owned by Lynn and
Judy Bowles and Synovus Mortgage Corporation on April 19, 2001. The
condemnees ified a timely notice of appeal, demanding a jury trial on the
issue of compensation. During the trial of the case, the condemnees
moved to dismiss the condemnation action. The condemnees argued that
the original petition was defective because the supporting affidavit was
not notarized. The motion to dismiss was granted by the trial court, and
the DOT appealed.'
The court of appeals reversed the ruling of the trial court.31 ° The
court of appeals first noted that the condemnees had withdrawn the
condemnation proceeds that were filed in the registry of the court.31'
By doing so, the court of appeals determined that the condemnees had
acquiesced
to the judgment of the superior court that vested title in the
2
31

DOT.

In Cedartown North Partnership, LLC v. Georgia Department of
3 13 the DOT filed two condemnation petitions pursuant
Transportation,
to O.C.G.A. § 32-3-5314 and O.C.G.A. § 32-3-6315 against two parcels
of real property owned by Cedartown North Partnership, LLC.31 6 The
estimated just compensation, in the amount of $17,600, was deposited
in the registry of the superior court. On September 1, 2006, Cedartown's
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O.C.G.A. § 32-3-5 (2009).
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registered agent, Byron Slaughter, was served with the condemnation
petitions. Cedartown filed a notice of appeal in each condemnation
action on October 5, 2006, thirty-four days later. The DOT sought to
dismiss the appeals because they were filed more than thirty days after
service of process. The trial court granted the DOT's motion to dismiss
the appeals, and Cedartown appealed. 17
Cedartown first argued that the period to fie an appeal had been
equitably tolled because statements made by counsel for the DOT to
Cedartown's attorney led Cedartown's attorney to believe that the DOT's
petitions had not been served on Cedartown. Specifically, in a conversation between counsel for Cedartown and counsel for the DOT, counsel for
Cedartown asked counsel for the DOT if his client had been served.31
Counsel for the DOT responded that "no petitions had been fied or
served on his client."3 19
The court of appeals held that the doctrine of equitable estoppel did
not apply because the failure to file a timely appeal was a jurisdictional
issue that deprived the superior court of subject matter jurisdiction.3 20
The court of appeals noted that subject matter jurisdiction "'cannot be
conferred by agreement or consent, or be waived.'"321 Accordingly, the
court of2 appeals held that equitable tolling was unavailable to Cedar32
town.

Cedartown also alleged that pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-3-96,"2 the
thirty-day period was tolled due to the DOT's fraud.3" The court of
appeals noted that O.C.G.A. § 9-3-96 only provides for the tolling of the
statute of limitations.3" Accordingly, the court of appeals held that
the argument was without merit because the period for filing an appeal
is not a statute of limitations.32 6 The court of appeals also held that
no fraud occurred. 27 The court reasoned that the DOT's statement
that the condemnation action had not been served on Slaughter was

317. Id.
318. Id. at 54-55, 673 S.E.2d at 564. At the time of this conversation, counsel for
Cedartown also represented Cedartown's registered agent for service of process. Id.
Therefore, counsel for Cedartown's reference to his "client" was ambiguous. See id. at 56,
673 S.E.2d at 565.
319. Id. at 55, 673 S.E.2d at 564.
320. Id. at 56, 673 S.E.2d at 565.
321. Id. (quoting Redmond v. Walters, 228 Ga. 417, 417, 186 S.E.2d 93, 94 (1971)).
322. Id.
323. O.C.GA § 9-3-96 (2007).
324. Cedartown, 296 Ga. App. at 57, 673 S.E.2d at 565.
325. Id., 673 S.E.2d at 566.
326. Id.
327. Id.
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accurate because the petition had been served upon him in his capacity
3
as registered agent for Cedartown and not in his individual capacity.

328. Id. at 56, 673 S.E.2d at 565.
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